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Abstract 
 
For years, there has been a lack of representation for indigenous peoples in communities, 
and most importantly in parliament. This is a very common trait in the South American Andes, 
which houses the largest number of indigenous groups in the continent. This thesis focuses on 
Ecuador and Bolivia due to their indigenous population and their history, or lack thereof, with 
indigenous people in parliament. For my hypothesis, I argue that parliamentary representation of 
indigenous peoples, can help ensure that their rights are protected, and their unique interests are 
heard and translated into relevant policies, while at the same time preventing conflict. I also 
argue that underrepresentation is likely due to a combination of actual barriers to participation 
and an overall sense of alienation from mainstream electoral processes. While Bolivian 
democracy was more stable and inclusive under the Morales government than under previous 
ones, this study finds that the influence of other government officials and economic needs played 
a part in changes for the rights of the indigenous. The study shows that Bolivian politics revolved 
around the increase, and then decrease, in indigenous rights under their first indigenous 
president, Evo Morales.  In this thesis, I also follow Ecuadorian politics involving indigenous 
groups. Lastly, the thesis examines a comparison between the two states and how they relate 
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Political Representation for Indigenous Peoples in the Andes 
 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
The representation of indigenous peoples in parliament is first and foremost a reflection 
and symbol of the State’s recognition of the unique interests, needs and rights of indigenous 
peoples. Such representation presupposes the recognition of indigenous peoples as a distinct 
identity and legal category in each country. Indigenous peoples are all too often lumped together 
with minorities or other vulnerable sectors of society. Traditional and historical discrimination 
against indigenous candidates, the limited impact that indigenous representatives have had on 
indigenous peoples’ lives, and a general lack of confidence in national decision-making bodies, 
where experience may be at odds with existing indigenous decision-making institutions, may 
explain the relative apathy of indigenous voters and the low representation of indigenous peoples 
in parliament.  
I argue that parliamentary representation of indigenous peoples, a traditionally 
underrepresented and historically marginalized group, can help ensure that their rights are 
protected, and their unique interests are heard and translated into relevant policies, while at the 
same time preventing conflict between government officials and the Indigenous constituents they 
represent. Indigenous representation in parliament can also benefit society at large, because 
indigenous practices and knowledge can provide solutions to complex environmental, 
developmental and governance problems that all societies face today. 
I also argue that underrepresentation is likely due to a combination of actual barriers to 
participation and an overall sense of alienation from mainstream electoral processes. Barriers to 
participation include, but are not limited to, undue conditions for voter registration, access to the 
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voting booth in rural areas, the political parties’ unwillingness to find indigenous candidates or 
place them high on their party lists, and a lack of adequate political party funding.  
The methodology for this paper will consist of a Qualitative Study. The sources I have 
included in this research are books regarding South American politics. There are also journal 
articles based on indigenous rights, Ecuadorian and Bolivian politics, as well as United Nations 
declarations and forums that have discussed Indigenous heritage and definitions.     
The Andes is a region that spans across South America from Colombia through Chile. It 
has been historically and culturally attached to many indigenous populations surrounding those 
countries. Their rich culture and dialects have been passed on through many generations, even 
through the colonization period by Spain and Portugal. Although many aspects of South 
American life have become Europeanized, indigenous groups still try to maintain the familiarity 
of their ancestors through much of their daily activities. Today, there are about 30-40 million 
indigenous people in South America, yet they are underrepresented in their respective 
governments. Andean indigenous groups are an inherently complex issue, especially in Bolivia 
and Ecuador which have similar colonial legacies and have developed along comparable political 
and economic trajectories. Indigenous communities need political access to fight for their rights 
and to hold their governments accountable. The key to the actualization of human rights for 
indigenous peoples lies within their greater political inclusion. The significance of political 
access for indigenous people’s human rights is threefold. First, the existence of relatively stable 
democracies in Bolivia and Ecuador present opportunities for indigenous communities to 
participate politically through legitimate means. Second, only the indigenous communities truly 
know the unique challenges they face and must have political representation to voice these 
concerns and to ensure legislative change. Finally, without the specific knowledge that is held by 
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indigenous peoples, outsiders have few opportunities to appropriately and accurately represent 
them. I argue that greater participation by indigenous people in political life has a direct effect on 
their human rights protection and land protection from corporations. This thesis will examine the 
hierarchical status of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador, the status of their human rights, 
and the obstacles that must be overcome for them to have full political access.  
In 2007, the United Nations put forth the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.  According to Article 43 of the declaration, it is made to enshrine the rights that 
“constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous 
peoples of the world” (UNDRIP, 2008, p. 14). The UNDRIP establishes a universal framework 
of minimum survival standards for the dignity and well-being of the world's indigenous peoples. 
It is the most comprehensive international instrument on indigenous peoples' collective rights, 
including the rights to self-determination, traditional lands and culture. The Declaration is the 
product of almost 25 years of deliberation by U.N. member states and indigenous groups. It is 
responsible for the thousands of indigenous groups worldwide who may feel unheard or 
misrepresented.  
Because of the diversity of indigenous peoples, the U.N. body has not officially adopted a 
definition for the term indigenous. However, they have developed an understanding of this term 
based on the following:  
• Self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the 
community as their member.  
• Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies 
• Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources  
• Distinct social, economic or political systems  
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• Distinct language, culture and beliefs  
• Form non-dominant groups of societies  
• Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as 
distinctive peoples and communities (UNDRIP, 2008, p. 14).  
According to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “the term ‘indigenous’ has 
prevailed as a generic term for many years. In some countries, there may be preference for other 
terms including tribes, first peoples/nations, aboriginals, ethnic groups, adivasi, janajati., etc., but 
for all practical purposes can be used interchangeably with ‘indigenous peoples’ (United 
Nations, 2006, pp. 1-2). However, in some cases, the notion of being termed “indigenous” has 
negative connotations and some people may choose not to reveal or define their origin. We 
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CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 
 
Deborah Yashar, professor of politics at Princeton, examines the changing terms, and 
scope of ethnic representation in Bolivia and Ecuador. Her chapter, “Indigenous Politics in the 
Andes: Changing Patterns of Recognition, Reform, and Representation”, discusses how these 
Latin American states wrote indigenous people out of formal politics only to be confronted at the 
end of the twentieth century with the rise of significant indigenous movements demanding 
recognition, representation and reform. Yashar argues that the mobilization of indigenous and 
popular communities is both a means of widening the democratic spectrum and a deep source of 
political tension and highlights the desire of some indigenous groups to be represented by 
officials with the same ethnicity as them (Yashar, 2006, pp. 257-292). 
As indigenous groups move toward inclusion and equality in politics, their respective 
governments are facing criticism for the stances they take that fail the interest of indigenous 
people. John Crabtree’s article states that the “governments of both Andean countries face 
criticism for policies which seek to boost investment but fail adequately to take into account the 
interests of local people, who say these projects threaten their physical and social environment” 
(Crabtree, 2012, pp.1). The governments elected with the support of indigenous populations have 
taken steps to enshrine indigenous rights in their respective legal codes. In Ecuador, President 
Rafael Correa reformed his country’s constitution, extending indigenous rights. As in Bolivia, 
the 2008 constitution in Ecuador states - in an echo of the International Labor Organization's 
convention no. 169 - that indigenous peoples should have the right to "free, informed and prior 
consultation" where development projects take place on or under their lands. Crabtree also states 
that “the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador reflect aspects of what has been called the "pink 
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wave" in Latin America, a reversion against the free-wheeling neo-liberal policies in vogue up 
until the early years of the new millennium” (Crabtree, 2012, pp.1). Both countries have pursued 
policies highly critical of the United States and its policies towards Latin America. 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is an 
international instrument adopted by the United Nations on September 13, 2007, to enshrine, 
according to Article 43, the rights that “constitute the minimum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.”  The UNDRIP protects collective 
rights that may not be addressed in other human rights charters that emphasize individual rights, 
and also safeguards the individual rights of indigenous people. However, it is not a legally 
binding document under international law (United Nations General Assembly, 2008, pp.14).  
The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues provided an information 
sheet on the proper understanding of the term indigenous. There is no specific definition 
provided by the UN for the word indigenous, instead it has key terms that can be used to help 
identify these groups. It includes, self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level 
and accepted by the community as their member, historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or 
pre-settler societies, strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources, distinct social, 
economic or political systems, distinct language, culture and beliefs, form non-dominant groups 
of society, and lastly, resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and 
systems as distinctive peoples and communities (United Nations, 2006, pp. 1-2).  
Aside from the United Nations, there are many organizations that work on improving and 
fighting for the rights of underrepresented groups. Most of the time they are non-governmental 
organizations. Minority Rights Group International is an international human rights organization 
founded with the objective of working to secure rights for ethnic, national, religious and 
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linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples around the world. Their website provides data and 
critical information that can help us better understand the circumstances these groups face daily. 
Because many of us can be so out of touch with this topic, they provide the knowledge that can 
keep us informed (Minority Rights Group International, n.d, minorityrights.org/country/ecuador).  
The Sheffield Institute for International Development is another group that provides 
research on indigenous groups from developing countries. In a Bolivian census conducted in 
2012, it showed that there was a 20% decrease in indigenous self-identification. Researcher 
Lorenza Fontana worked with SIID to map the hypothesis of the dramatic decrease that occurred 
in a heavily indigenous country. She had found that the wording of the census questions could 
have thrown many of those answering off. However, there are others who believe that the 
questioning was a tactic move for the government to seem more mestizo as opposed to 
indigenous (Fontana, 2013, para.1).  
Peter DeShazo concisely summarizes a series of expert panels on the status of indigenous 
politics in the Andean region (DeShazo, 2009, pp. 4-13). Each panel addressed a country in the 
region, namely Bolivia, Peru, or Ecuador. The consensus of the panelists is that conditions have 
been more favorable in Bolivia and Ecuador for indigenous groups to mobilize than in Peru. The 
impediments to indigenous groups in Peru include: President Garcia's "anti-indigenous policy;" 
media portrayal of this group as violent and disinterested in dialogue; and the geographical 
divide between indigenous groups in the highlands and those in the Amazon region. The 
panelists also conclude that indigenous mobilization creates a great backlash against neo-liberal 
policies that have been adopted by their governments. Ultimately, the future for indigenous 
political participation looks stable in Bolivia and Ecuador but some experts do not foresee 
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indigenous parties having a successful presidential candidate anytime soon, even after Evo 
Morales in Bolivia. DeShazo creates a fascinating summary of this prestigious conference. 
In 2019, the Waorani indigenous group of the Ecuadorian Amazon won a landmark case. 
After long protesting oil extraction in its territory, the community is suing three government 
bodies - the Ministry of Energy and Non-renewable Natural Resources, the Secretary of 
Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Environment - for violating their rights and putting their 
territory up for an international oil auction. The group marched to the court house with 
supporters dressed in their traditional clothing made of tree materials on their land. Kimberely 
Brown, a reporter for Al Jazeera covered the historic win for the Waorani (Brown, 2019).  
A very valuable source of information are the country reports in the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) website. It shows reports from visits made by the 
Special Rapporteur about human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people. This 
article informs the public about the status of indigenous people in Ecuador and how oil 
exploration is impacting their wellbeing. According to the Special Rapporteur, Jose Amaya, “the 
purpose of the visit was to better gain an understanding of the situation of the human rights of the 
indigenous peoples of Ecuador through discussions with various social players on issues such as 
the effects of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution, which recognizes the collective rights of 
indigenous peoples; their access to justice; their rights to land and natural resources; the impact 
of the oil industry on their communities; and concerns over negotiations on the free trade 
agreement with the United States of America” (Amaya, 2009, pp.5). 
The Federation of Human Rights is a non-governmental federation for human rights 
organizations. Founded in 1922, FIDH is the second oldest international human rights 
organization worldwide after Anti-Slavery International. In 2018, they conducted a case study 
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based on 18 projects that were supported by Chinese banks for development on indigenous lands 
in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. Along with various social 
organizations from Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Brazil, FIDH has produced a report 
that reveals human rights and environmental abuses by Chinese mining and oil corporations with 
the complicity of the states of the region. The report, entitled Evaluation of the Extraterritorial 
Obligations of the People’s Republic of China: Case Studies from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador and Peru, denounces some “knowingly violating behaviors” and the lack of willpower 
of the Asian State for monitoring and enforcing the minimum standards required by its 
companies and banks (International Federation for Human Rights, 2012).  
The Ministry of the Netherlands developed a study through their Policy and Operations 
Evaluation Department about the equity, accountability and effectiveness in decentralization 
policies in Bolivia. A section in the paper is specifically on the Law of Popular Participation. The 
Law of Popular Participation, announced in 1994, came at a time when local government in 
Bolivia was relatively non-existent. This law established a new standard for resource allocation, 
mandating 20 percent of national tax revenue to be transferred to municipalities; more 
responsibilities regarding health and infrastructure shifted to the municipalities; local 
representatives oversaw decision making processes; lastly, additional municipalities were created 
to include suburbs and rural areas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2012, p. 13).  
In “Losing Members and Winning Votes?” Diana Davila Gordillo examines the 
representative capacity of the Ecuadorian party Pachakutik, formed in 1996 as the political 
branch of Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), deemed the “most 
consequential indigenous movement in Latin America” (Yashar, 2005, p.260). The party was 
very successful in its first years such that in 2002 the candidate the Pachakutik party supported in 
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an electoral alliance won the presidency. However, the alliance dissolved six months after the 
candidate took office, and Pachakutik revised its policy of forming electoral alliances (Davila-
Gordillo, 2018). 
In 2008, Morales implemented the Family, Community, and Intercultural Health (SAFCI) 
model. SAFCI is a health policy which is constituted in the new way of feeling, thinking, 
understanding and doing health. Reciprocally, it complements and articulates the health 
personnel and traditional doctors of the Native Peasant Nations and Indigenous Peoples with the 
person, family, community, mother earth and cosmos (Ministerio de Salud y Deportes, 2013, 
pp.1). In 2013, the Bolivian Ministry of Health distributed a report that described a general 
framework for the implementation and application of specific strategies and policies aimed at 
different vulnerable populations and age groups. The goals of the policy include: strengthened 
primary health care; full participation and empowerment of the community in health-related 
issues; and reduced morbidity and mortality for women and children (United Nations Population 
Fund/Every Woman Every Child, 2016).  
Under the Morales administration, indigenous healthcare beliefs and practices stepped 
out from long shadows cast by colonialism and racism. Along with his implementation of more 
diversity and inclusion of indigenous people in parliament, he promoted the fusion of indigenous 
medicine to be practiced along with Western biomedicine. Morales’s revolutionary objective was 
to create a new plurinational healthcare system (Hartmann, 2019). In Hartmann’s article, he 
explains how Morales achieved this during his presidency and how the healthcare system is 
under threat under Bolivia’s new government.  
The indigenous movement in Ecuador notoriously lost its political influence during 
Rafael Correa’s government, which is counterintuitive, as both actors – in theory – shared a 
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similar political agenda. In “The Indigenous Movement in Ecuador: Resource Access and Rafael 
Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution”, Jima-Gonzales and Paradela-Lopez analyze how the exchange 
relationship between resource types and resource access mechanisms of the Ecuadorian 
indigenous movement were affected under Rafael Correa’s administration ((Jima-Gonzalez and 
Paradela-Lopez, 2018). The results indicate that the exchange relationship between co-optation 
and appropriation employed by Correa’s regime altered the indigenous movement’s resource 
access during 2007–2017, resulting in the movement’s loss of influence and legitimacy within 
the Ecuadorian political arena.  
In 2008, voters in Ecuador approved a new and progressive constitution. Indigenous 
leaders questioned whether the new document would benefit social movements or strengthen the 
hand of President Rafael Correa, who appeared to be occupying political spaces that they had 
previously held. Marc Becker argues that “Correa's relations with indigenous movements point 
to the complications, limitations, and deep tensions inherent in pursuing revolutionary changes 
within a constitutional framework” (Becker, 2011, pp. 47). Although indigenous movements, as 
well as most social movements, shared Correa's stated desire to curtail neoliberal policies and 
implement social and economic strategies that would benefit a majority of the country's people, 
they increasingly clashed over how to realize those objectives. The political outcome of the new 
constitution depended not on the actions of the constituent assembly but on whether organized 
civil society could force the government to implement the ideals that the assembly had drafted 
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CHAPTER THREE: Ecuador 
 
Ecuador is home to 1.1 million indigenous people out of a population of more than 17 
million inhabitants. There are currently 14 indigenous nationalities living in the country, grouped 
into local, regional, and national organizations. According to the last recorded census in 2010, 
6.8 percent of the Ecuadorian population self-identify as indigenous, which is an increase from 
6.1 percent in 2001(Minority Group International, 2018). 
Ecuador has a very ethnically diverse population. As of 2014, the largest ethnic group 
remains Mestizos, descendants of Spanish colonists and indigenous people, who make up 71.9 
percent of the population. Until the 1950s, the geography of ethnicity in Ecuador remained very 
well-defined until a jump in migration. Just decades ago, most Mestizos lived in small rural 
towns in the countryside, indigenous people made up much of the rural Sierra population, black 
residents lived in Esmeraldas, Carchi and Imbabura provinces, while the white population 
resided mostly in the large cities. Due primarily to pressure on the Sierra land resources, some 
indigenous groups began migrating to the cities and many began switching their ethnic identity 
to Mestizo beginning in the 1980s.  
The indigenous people of Ecuador have made tremendous strides since their first 
mobilizations in the 1970s and 1980s. They only comprise 20 percent of the total Ecuadorian 
population, yet they are “the strongest indigenous group in the Americas” (DeShazo, 2009, p. 5). 
This is mainly due to the formation of CONAIE in the 1990s. It is a political umbrella group 
founded in 1986 that became a more prominent actor in local and national politics. CONAIE was 
the result of an alliance between three regional indigenous organizations: Confederation of 
Peoples of Kichwa Nationality (ECUARUNARI), from the Ecuadorian highlands; Confederation 
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of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE), from the Amazonian 
zone; and the Confederation of the Indigenous Nationalities and Peoples of the Ecuadorian Coast 
(CONAICE), from the coast (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 3). CONAIE 
realized that different agendas within the Ecuadorian indigenous organizations could divide their 
movement and avoid its national consolidation. CONAIE then functioned as the voice of the 
indigenous movement, representing dozens of different indigenous organizations and identities, 
and its confederative nature ensured that it maintained the spirit of the movement (Jima-
Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 3). CONAIE’s efforts were often directed toward 
recovering abandoned State competencies that affect indigenous populations. The organization 
fostered a cultural agenda that focused on the recognition of Ecuador as a Plurinational State in 
order to embed the indigenous culture within Ecuador’s cultural richness (Jima-Gonzalez and 
Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 4).  
In 1995, CONAIE joined the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik, (the 
Pachakutik party) because of the shared goal of uniting minority voices under a single umbrella 
political party. The Pachakutik party was remarkably successful in its first legislative election in 
1996, winning ten percent of the seats in Ecuador’s National Assembly and at one point, 
nominating a candidate for the presidency (DeShazo, 2009, pg 1). The success of the Pachakutik 
was significant but short-lived. The elections in April 2009 revealed that most of the larger 
parties won seats, but the Pachakutik party was not mentioned in the results and in 2013, they 
only received 3.26 percent of the votes. Despite the view of CONAIE being one of the most 
successful indigenous movements in Latin America, much remains to be achieved in terms of 
their political representation and access to the political arena. For example, Ecuador drafted and 
passed a new constitution in 1998, including provisions for indigenous political participation, yet 
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this reform has not brought any substantial policy changes for them. Also, many indigenous 
Ecuadorians face discrimination at the polls. The Supreme Electoral Court was reported by the 
United Nations Human Rights Council as “promoting discriminatory practices against the 
country’s indigenous citizens” (Amaya, 2008, p.18). This illustrates that CONAIE is making 
progress, but remains an inadequate remedy to the issue.  
The indigenous movement in Ecuador has been among the most successful new social 
movements in Latin America since the late 1980s (Jameson, 2011, p. 63). However, the 
movement had been weakened during the Correa era. An effective strategy of his government 
was to “financially asphyxiate indigenous organizations” (Martinez Novo, 2019, p.141). The first 
year of Correa’s government generated great expectations among CONAIE’s leaders, especially 
in the second round of the presidential election, in which Alianza PAIS was impressively 
supported by CONAIE (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 5). However, Correa’s 
government pushed for state expansion which included natural resource extraction from 
indigenous territories. While Correa’s government justified it as a way of financing social 
politics, the main indigenous organizations considered it a threat to their culture and values. In 
fact, several authors believe that the extraction conflict deepened the degradation of the 
relationship between the Ecuadorian government and CONAIE, which increased personal 
animosities among several indigenous leaders and Rafael Correa (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-
Lopez, 2018, pp. 6).  
Once Correa won the presidential election, it created more crises for indigenous 
movements who were losing their credibility. Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution main goal was 
creating solid institutions, hence the disruptive power of the indigenous movement – under this 
newfound institutional logic – was no longer needed (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, 
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pp. 9). Through the creation of new ministries, secretaries, and governmental bodies, the politics 
of the indigenous movement were openly rejected by Correa’s regime, oftentimes erasing the 
movement’s strategy of defending its rights on the streets. The strengthening of both institutions 
and the rule of law, located at the heart of the Citizens’ Revolution, were the aspects that clashed 
the most with the “corporatist” organizational strategies employed by CONAIE and other 
indigenous organizations, often equated by Correa as corrupt and illegitimate practices.  
Another tactic used by the Correa administration was the use of cultural appropriation to 
promote an amicable image towards the indigenous people. On his extensively known TV 
program “Enlace Ciudadano,” Correa made a public display of central cultural indigenous 
markers: clothing, language, and folklore (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 11). 
Under this logic, even though Correa maintained confrontations with the indigenous movement 
on other topics, in the eyes of his TV audience he was boosting and supporting the movement’s 
agenda. He later wore indigenous clothing and used ethnic decorations on his shirt as a part of a 
personal marking worn in public to depict “pride” in his heritage. Gabriela Rivadeneira, the 
National Assembly President from 2013–2017, adopted a similar clothing style, revealing a sense 
of pride absent from previous administrations. The appropriation of these subtle cultural markers 
by the most prominent public officials made a strong statement: indigenous clothing is a symbol 
of Ecuadorian pride, and indigenous people are no longer the only ones entitled to proudly depict 
their culture by wearing their traditional clothing publicly (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 
2018, pp. 11). The timing of this played to Correa’s favor because by the time he started to use 
indigenous cultural symbols, the indigenous agenda was already settled through self-production. 
In the eyes of his supporters and bystanders, however, Correa openly embraced the indigenous 
cultural agenda and was considered a pioneer in this regard. As a result, indigenous people could 
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no longer employ their own cultural markers with the same initial force, mainly because the 
progressive figure of Correa already appropriated these markers (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-
Lopez, 2018, pp. 12). Under the Correa administration, indigenous people’s cultural resources 
were selectively appropriated by the regime, which served to strengthen Correa’s positive image 
towards the movement and gradually reduced the movement’s potential mobilizing resources. 
Aside from appropriation, the Correa government regulated the financial operations and 
development work of foreign and national NGOs to control development money and the ability 
of civil society to resist the regime. Under Correa, the new Organic code of Territorial 
Organization, Autonomy and Decentralization (COOTAD) failed to “recognize the indigenous 
community, the backbone of the indigenous movement, as a fundamental unit of the state with a 
right to a budget allocation” (Martinez Novo, 2019, p.142). Instead Mestizo towns surrounded by 
indigenous communities were recognized. These Mestizo councils were politically and 
financially rewarded by Correa’s government and became an important social base for the 
regime. The government created parallel organizations that did receive funding and state support, 
meanwhile the indigenous movement lost control over their sources of funding and jobs.  
Not only did the Correa government try to deplete the indigenous community’s resources, 
it tried dividing them politically. Martinez Novo writes about an instance in which Marcelino 
Chumpi, a Shuar leader affiliated with the indigenous left-wing Pachakutik party, “won elections 
in Morona Santiago and became the province’s governor in 2009” (Martinez Novo, 2019, p.143). 
Correa’s political party, Alianza PAIS, made efforts to “divide the Shuar organization by 
distributing computers, boat motors and chickens to its membership” (Martinez Novo, 2019, 
p.143). This resulted in a group breaking away and supporting Correa. The government also 
made a large investment in the region and Correa frequently traveled to speak to the Shuar. Even 
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with all the effort from Correa’s party, Chumpi was re-elected in 2014. Furthermore, the 
government’s representatives began to travel to indigenous communities, diminishing the 
interlocutor attribute traditionally enjoyed by CONAIE. The government started to directly fund 
local communities’ projects, and establish direct contact with the movement’s grassroots in 
exchange for political loyalty (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 15). Clientelist 
exchanges are very common during the election period in South American countries. Poor areas, 
especially those with very minimal resources and exposure to commercial goods, are bribed and 
bought out by financially stable parties. Past presidential candidates have brought bags of rice, 
toys for small children, and some had even given out CDs with their music. This type of 
campaigning minimizes the chances of indigenous candidates with very little support and money. 
Martinez Novo has stated that the exacerbation of internal divisions, as well as the cooptation of 
bases and leaders, could explain CONAIE’s crisis: 
Correa has carried on the strategy of distributing money to the 
communities, through social programs such as the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano, subsidies for housing and other programs such as Socio 
Páramo and Socio Bosque (subsidies for environmental protection), in 
order to coopt the bases of the movement without acknowledging 
CONAIE. Indigenous leaders state that this governmental penetration 
divides communities and destroys grassroots organizations (Martinez 
Novo, 2019, pg. 143).  
 
Data for indigenous participation in parliament is very scarce because it is sometimes not 
reported at all. According to a 2014 Survey Report conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
it was found that Ecuador had 7 indigenous representatives in parliament. Five were male and 
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two were female. However, the rest of the information is unfortunately “not available” and these 
numbers were found to be a secondary source for the report. This situation brings many 
questions to the table in terms of misrepresentation and if it was being done purposely by the 
Correa administration. 
At the beginning of his presidential period, Correa named Mónica Chuji, a Sarayaku 
leader, as Head of the Communication Secretariat in his first cabinet. After a short period of 
time, she became an Assembly candidate under Correa’s political party. When she won the 
election, Chuji remained antagonistic towards the president, often criticizing him for turning his 
political program to the Right (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 11). After her 
resignation from Alianza PAIS in September 2008, Chuji became an active member of the 
opposition and, in 2011, she faced a very polemic trial in which she was accused of slandering 
the Communication Secretary, Vinicio Alvarado. Considering these events, Chuji herself has 
recognized that indigenous people’s participation in the government has an adverse effect on 
communities, who often feel confused by their leader’s role and tend to reject the movement’s 
organization and structure (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 11).  
The Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s strength developed due to the inaction of the 
State and, when neo-liberal administrations were in power, the indigenous movement could 
freely spread, becoming a relevant actor within the national scene. The arrival of Correa’s 
Citizens Revolution (Revolución Ciudadana), however, the main purpose of which was the 
institutionalization of the State, ended this period of influence for the indigenous movement, 
which had begun to compete with the Ecuadorian government in both material and ideological 
spheres. The movement’s once influential and persistent stance against the government was 
unfortunately left in a fragile state during the Correa period. Ecuador still participated in 
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exclusion, violence and discrimination towards indigenous people regardless of Correa’s 
appropriation and political programs of inclusion that did not serve them. The idea of 
institutionalization and labeling indigenous people as citizens implied the suppression of their 
demands which is the recognition of their identities. This emphasis on individual rights excluded 
indigenous peoples, with their communal-based societies. His citizens' revolution deemphasized 
social movements and reinforced colonial ideologies that oppressed and erased the unique 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Bolivia 
 
There are currently 38 recognized indigenous groups that reside in Bolivia. With the 
adoption of UNDRIP and a change in their constitution, Bolivia adopted the status of a 
plurinational state. Nevertheless, the country’s indigenous population still experiences 
challenges. As of 2012, the Bolivian census recorded that many recognized peoples reside in the 
Andes and are Quechua and Aymara, who self-identify as sixteen nations. Other groups include, 
Chiquitano, Guarani, and Moxeno, as well as Afro-Bolivians, and interestingly, small 
communities of Japanese and German Mennonites. 
However, their 2012 census recorded a significant drop in people identifying as 
indigenous from 66.4 percent in 2001to 41 percent (Minority Rights Group International, 
2018).  After results were finalized, it was hypothesized that the modification of the 2012 census 
question on ethnic identification could have changed the data. In 2001, the question asked 
whether the person identified him/herself with an ‘indigenous or native people’, while in 2012 
the term ‘indigenous native peasant’ was used instead. The question was “As a Bolivian, do you 
belong to an indigenous native peasant nation or people?” with a tick-box ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer” 
(Fontana, 2013) 
The decrease in the indigenous population recorded in relation to the form of the question 
in the census sheds light on the discursive gaps between the rapid urbanization of the Bolivian 
population and the progressive rural lifestyle of the indigenous. According to the Sheffield 
Institute for International Development, “a whole debate has been going on between those who 
consider that indigenous identities are relentlessly diluted as a result of increased internal 
migration, and those who consider urbanization as an experience that reshapes, rather than 
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destroying, indigenous identities (Fontana, 2013). Their cultures, social structures, livelihoods, 
music, and languages have been shamed and discredited, and assimilation to Western cultural 
norms is often considered the only way to be taken seriously in our modern world.  
The status of the Bolivian indigenous, as the political minority, stands in contrast to the 
fact that they are the statistical majority, making up 60 percent of the population. The 2006 
election of Evo Morales was a major indigenous landmark in Bolivia’s history, as was the new 
Bolivian Constitution in 2007, which includes many provisions for indigenous peoples. 
Indigenous Bolivians have also aligned with a well-established political party, the Socialist 
Movement Party (MAS) which led to the election of Morales. The MAS party is currently the 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Significant legislation concerning government 
decentralization reform was also passed supporting the political rights of the indigenous 
Bolivians, with the aim of encouraging their political participation. The Law of Popular 
Participation was adopted in 1994, leading to the creation of new municipalities (314 in total), 
direct election of municipality officials, and a general increase in available resources and power 
to these municipalities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Netherlands, 2012, p.13). This created many 
opportunities for the marginalized indigenous groups to participate in decision-making processes 
at the local level. Instead of political majorities dominating at the federal level, the political arena 
has expanded in a more participative and democratic way. 
As the largest ethnic group in Bolivia, the indigenous communities had unions that 
represented them. Two of the most influential are the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of 
Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) and Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia 
(CSUTB). CONAMAQ is a confederation of traditional governing bodies of Quechua, Aymara 
and Uru-speaking highland indigenous communities in the departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, 
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Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija, Bolivia. CSUTB is the largest union of peasants in Bolivia. 
The CSUTCB was formed in 1979 in opposition to government sponsored peasant unions. These 
two groups were heavily involved in creating proposals for participation of indigenous peoples in 
the new constitution prior to Morales’s election.  
Both groups had the proposal for the creation of a Plurinational State as their main vision 
for the new constitution. According to former Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa, the term 
“plurinational” can be defined as the co-existence of several different nationalities within a larger 
state. In 2005, before Morales’s election, indigenous groups published their projects based on 
their visions and expectations of the new Bolivian constitution. The CSUTCB proposed the 
introduction of indigenous autonomies, based on right to self-government, indigenous political 
and administrative systems, territorial control (Poweska, 2013, pp. 256). They did not limit this 
proposal to the municipal level, but claimed that in the territories where the large territorial 
political structures of indigenous majority (Aymara, Quechua) remained, indigenous peoples 
should have the right to organize large regional and even supra-regional autonomies. The union 
also proposed that the indigenous have the right to elect their representatives to the national 
congress according to their cultural traditions, or uses and customs, and without the interference 
of the party system (Poweska, 2013, pp. 257). Finally, the union claimed the right of indigenous 
peoples to be consulted by the state regarding all decisions that would affect indigenous peoples 
and their territories, including the eventual exploitation of non-renewable resources in their 
territories, and that this consultation should be in advance, obligatory to the state, and legally 
binding. These proposals and claims seem self-explanatory for people who have lived on the 
land for centuries and are the largest ethnic group in the country, however, after years of 
colonization these rights have been stripped from them. They believed that with the help of a 
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fellow indigenous person running for president they could regain these rights under the new 
constitution.  
The CONAMAQ proposals went further in claiming a radical indigenous vision for the 
new state. Apart from everything postulated by the CSUTCB, CONAMAQ wanted indigenous 
peoples to have an indisputable right to control all the natural resources in their territories, 
including gas, oil, and other non-renewables (Poweska, 2013, pp. 257). The group proposed their 
governing to be based on Andean cosmology, which is a binary unity of oppositions, system of 
rotation on the national scale, and a system of pairs known as ‘chacha-warmi’. CONAMAQ, for 
example, wanted the president and vice-president to represent indigenous peoples and non-
indigenous inhabitants of Bolivia in rotation. This means that in one term the president would be 
indigenous and vice-president non-indigenous, and in the next term it would be the other way 
around.  
Besides important similarities, indigenous movements disagreed on some of the demands 
presented by other movements, so the various indigenous organizations decided to develop a 
common proposal for the new constitution. The result was the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact), 
presented in August 2006. Given that the Pacto de Unidad emerged from a consensus between 
different movements, the most radical demands of CONAMAQ were rejected, particularly those 
that were clearly inspired by the Andean point of view and did not reflect the vision of the 
lowlands of Bolivia. A proposal that was rejected included the introduction of ‘Qullasuyu’ as the 
new official name for the country (Poweska, 2013, pp. 258). Similarly, the two groups proposed 
the claim for proportional, direct representation of indigenous peoples in the national power, 
without mediation of the partisan system. However, the following year, MAS assemblymen 
withdrew all the entries about direct participation from the projected texts for the new state. It 
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was said that the decision about the withdrawal of the concept came from the presidential palace 
(Poweska, 2013, pp. 267). Morales was already elected president during this time so to the 
indigenous representatives it felt disloyal.  
Although the groups agreed on this claim for direct participation, they still disagreed 
when it came to the withdrawal of their entries. Some members of the CSUTCB accepted the 
withdrawal and felt that that the direct representation of the indigenous “was not necessary 
because indigenous peoples are in majority anyway, so no special systems of election are 
needed” (Poweska, 2013, pp. 267). The comment made by the CSUTCB was rejected by 
CONAMAQ:  
It is not about being majority or minority. And how are we going to 
count us? According to skin color? It is not about being indigenous or 
Aymara (...) we want the circumscriptions corresponding to our 
territorial system. It does not matter whether 60 per cent of Bolivians 
declare themselves indigenous or not. We want to choose our 
representatives from our territory and let the others choose their 
candidates in their territories (...). The principle was that the political 
parties could not control us anymore, that we do not want 
manipulation and corruption. When we choose our representatives 
directly from the grassroots, then we control the system and not some 
partisan mechanisms. (Poweska, 2013, pp. 267). 
The group protested that the government and the president were betraying indigenous peoples 
and that the decision to withdraw their proposal weakened the purpose of a plurinational state, 
since without direct representation there would be no recognition of the plurality of politics 
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existing within the country. The conflict between the indigenous groups and MAS was causing 
animosity and MAS quickly changed its position and the right to direct representation was 
included in the constitutional text.  
Despite progress since the first indigenous mobilization in the 1980s, the need for 
improvement remains, as evidenced by the lack of adequate indigenous representation in the 
Bolivian legislative bodies, the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Senators. There are 
only seven of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies reserved for representatives from indigenous 
areas, indicating that pro-indigenous rhetoric surrounding increased representation proved to be 
worthless. Though MAS is supported by most indigenous groups, this support emerged from the 
lack of political access in the 1990s rather than from the fact that MAS accurately reflects 
indigenous peoples’ views. Furthermore, information about the Law of Popular Participation has 
yet to reach rural areas; therefore, indigenous peoples are unaware of its existence and the 
corresponding details that apply to them, such as their available options for participation. This 
proves as no surprise that indigenous peoples have not yet been elected as municipal officers. 
Ultimately, indigenous Bolivians now have many codified laws to protect and to encourage their 
rights, yet the legislation does not accurately reflect the reality of indigenous political access.  
Evo Morales had served as president of Bolivia for nearly 14 years, creating history by 
becoming the first indigenous president in the plurinational state. His first major effort was to 
decolonize the state and provide an opportunity for indigenous peoples to participate in politics. 
Once in office, he filled 14 of 16 positions of his cabinet with people of indigenous descent; this 
included women. The women in the office were de pollera, those who wear the colorful gathered 
skirts and bowler hats associated with highland indigenous descent throughout the Andean 
world. Morales’s political party, the Movement toward Socialism, became the country’s 
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dominant political force. It opened opportunities for indigenous leaders to enter politics as town 
and city mayors, and at the regional and local levels. It would soon become the majority party in 
the national legislature. Morales’s movement is in large part responsible for a massive increase 
of indigenous participation in the national political process at all levels. Morales made it possible 
for indigenous people not to be viewed as second-class citizens and instead be enfranchised as 
indigenous.    
Indigenous people have the worst socio-demographic indicators and the largest 
inequalities in terms of access to social services and health in the Latin American region, 
including Bolivia. Attempts to implement policies that support indigenous people's health rights 
led to the development of intercultural health approaches. Under Morales’s leadership he made 
the healthcare system inclusive to indigenous peoples who have different beliefs and traditions 
and don’t participate in Western medicine. Article 18 guarantees the right to health and to a free, 
intercultural, and participatory universal healthcare system. It’s a rebuke to the colonial and 
neoliberal eras that excluded poor and Indigenous people from accessing and participating in the 
public healthcare system (Hartmann, 2019).  
In 2008, Morales implemented the Family, Community, and Intercultural Health (SAFCI) 
model. SAFCI is a health policy which is constituted in the new way of feeling, thinking, 
understanding and doing health. Reciprocally complements and articulates the health personnel 
and traditional doctors of the Native Peasant Nations and Indigenous Peoples with the person, 
family, community, mother earth and cosmos (Ministerio de Salud y Deportes, 2013, pp.1). 
SAFCI created a paradigm shift because it intentionally attempted to decolonize an unequal 
medical system which had rooted itself into Western biomedical practices. Bolivia legally 
recognized Indigenous medicine in 1985, meaning providers no longer faced imprisonment for 
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practicing traditional methods. Under Morales, the Vice Ministry of Intercultural Health certified 
more than 5,000 Indigenous naturopaths, herbalists, and midwives. Most revolutionary is that 
Indigenous medicine and practices entered the national health system (Hartmann, 2019). 
Although there had been progress made, skepticism remains throughout the Bolivian 
medical establishment. In a survey conducted in 2018, many indigenous healers “expressed 
feeling misunderstood, underappreciated, and poorly integrated into the local health system” 
(Hartmann, 2019). An indigenous healer shared that “Medical doctors don’t take us seriously. 
They kick us to one side, right? I say that we should be equal because we cure people too. 
Although we don’t have a medical degree, we cure people like they do” (Hartmann, 2019). The 
rights and inclusiveness of indigenous peoples has been a tumultuous ride for many of them 
throughout many sectors of the government.  
The second half of Morales’s tenure, however, saw more conflict with indigenous 
constituencies, often over competing indigenous and state priorities. Most notable among these 
was the 2011 Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) controversy. 
Morales’s plan to facilitate trade with Brazil by building a highway through a national park, also 
containing indigenous territories, provoked a backlash. Indigenous advocates saw the highway as 
a betrayal privileging the country’s extraction-based national economic model over the rights of 
particular indigenous groups. Morales never successfully resolved this conflict of interest during 
his years in office. At the same time, a growing number of mobile city dwellers of indigenous 
descent, while appreciative of Morales’s efforts, over time grew disgruntled with his 
administration’s perceived exclusive focus on indigenous questions rather than economic 
opportunities for all, and with his disinclination to leave office.  
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Throughout Latin America, the only way for indigenous people to gain access to land 
reforms, social services and several other state-organized reforms was by joining a “peasant” 
organization and channeling their demands through these federations. However, according to 
Yashar, “indigenous people had strong incentives to publicly forsake their ethnic identities and to 
assume a class-based identity in union organizations and exchanges with political officials” 
(Yashar, 2006, p. 260). They also complemented corporatist measures with educational programs 
designed to promote assimilation. In Bolivia, “such assimilationist programs were put into 
place…to incorporate people perceived as backwards into the ranks of a new, and presumably 
more civilized nation” (Yashar, 2006, p. 260). She also notes that, “states encouraged indigenous 
men and women to discard any public display of indigenous identity, [and] encouraged the 
adoption of mestizo identities” (Yashar, 2006, p. 261). By changing their ethnic status from 
indigenous to mestizo, it allowed them to “depoliticize ethnic cleavages” (Yashar, 2006, p. 261).  
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CHAPTER FIVE: Ecuador and Bolivia, A Comparison 
 
Indigenous populations in the Andean region of Latin America have played an 
increasingly larger role in local politics in the past two decades, with some successes at the 
national level as well. In Ecuador and Bolivia, people who self-identified as indigenous profited 
from political reforms aimed at decentralization, promotion of greater autonomy for local and 
municipal government, and expanded political participation.  
Both countries had the opportunity to change their constitutions, giving indigenous 
groups the chance to propose new platforms and programs for the advancement of their 
movements. On September 28, 2008, voters in Ecuador approved a new constitution by a wide 
margin. This was the country's twentieth constitution since becoming an independent republic in 
1830. Under the guidance of the young and charismatic president Rafael Correa, the constitution 
promised to bring an end to neoliberal policies that had shifted wealth from marginalized peoples 
to elite corporate interests (Becker, 2011, pp. 47). The 2008 constituent assembly provided a 
turning point for indigenous movements by introducing a historic opportunity to decolonize the 
country's political structures. Indigenous leaders emphasized that the revisions they had proposed 
to Ecuador's constitution would benefit everyone in the country, not just indigenous peoples.  
Correa’s political movement Alianza Pais had won 70 percent of the vote for the 
assembly. Its margin of victory was due, in part, to some activists who broke from the 
indigenous-led Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (United Plurinational Pachakutik 
Movement, referred to as Pachakutik) and joined Correa's party (Becker, 2011, pp. 50). Two of 
the prominent indigenous members who had joined Correa’s party were Monica Chuji, one of 
the more radical members of Correa’s party who declared her allegiance to CONAIE’s 
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movement, and Pedro de la Cruz, the president of the Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas, Indigenas, y Negras (National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous and Negro 
Organizations, FENOCIN). De la Cruz had been an alternative congressional deputy for the 
socialist party and won the election to become a delegate for Alianza Pais. Many indigenous 
activists believed that they could most effectively influence the content of the constitution by 
working within Correa’s government. However, as seen in other instances, Leftist parties and 
social movements did not fare any better than their conservative opponents in gaining seats in the 
assembly. Pachakutik won only four seats and, together with the traditional parties, was left 
behind as an increasingly marginalized and irrelevant political force. Correa’s opponents 
complained that his approach favored liberal, individualistic politics and that decision-making 
processes in Alianza Pais were highly centralized and authoritarian. Correa "acted in a more 
strategic, although highly 'top-down fashion" than Evo Morales's Movimiento al Socialismo 
(Movement Toward Socialism) in Bolivia (Becker, 2011, pp. 51). There would not have been 
true structural change without the participation of social movements. Indigenous groups feared 
that Correa’s victories would come at their expense.  
As in Bolivia, the idea of a plurinational state for indigenous peoples emphasized 
inclusion of their culture and identity. They did not want to assimilate, but instead be recognized 
as a partner in the state. Indigenous activists reinforced the importance of political changes, 
specifically the demand for acknowledgement of the plurinational characteristic of the country. 
Aside from the recognition of the 14 indigenous nationalities, they wanted acknowledgement of 
the systems of life, education and economy that were different from those of the dominant 
society (Becker, 2011, pp. 51-52). Cecilia Velasque, former public attorney with the national 
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Department of Indigenous Peoples and Communities, and Coordinator of REMPE (the Network 
of Political Women of Ecuador), says: 
Plurinationality signifies the recognition and self-determination of 
indigenous peoples; that there will be a political sphere of government by 
and for indigenous peoples. But plurinationality has been forgotten in the 
economic model, has been forgotten in environmental policy and in the 
management of natural resources, has been forgotten in the area of water, 
has been forgotten in the area of culture, has been forgotten in the area of 
the decolonization of public and private institutions. Because colonialism 
still thrives in Ecuador; there is discrimination against indigenous people, 
it marginalizes us, it expresses itself through racism, it excludes and it 
minimalizes the existence of indigenous peoples (Llewellyn, 2014).  
CONAIE had proposed for the following statement, "Ecuador constitutes a plurinational, 
sovereign, communitarian, social and democratic, independent, secular, solidarity, unitary state 
with gender equality", to be the definition for the state in its new constitution. However, the 
constituent assembly refused to begin the definition with the word “plurinational” and instead 
agreed to include the word in the text (Becker, 2011, pp. 53). Article 1 of Ecuador’s constitution 
declared that it was a: “constitutional state of rights and justice, social, democratic, sovereign, 
independent, unitary, intercultural, plurinational, and secular (Republica del Ecuador, 2008). The 
term raised controversy as a radical interpretation of it was perceived as separatist. Monica Chuji 
argues “that interculturality and plurinationality are not opposite concepts. While interculturality 
recognizes the differences within a society, the recognition of a Plurinational State would allow 
the translation of that recognition into concrete rights, and the implementation and enforcement 
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of concrete policies” (Jima-Gonzalez, 2018, pp. 18). Similar to Bolivia, there were many debates 
on the language and how to really define the term “plurinational.” CONAIE wanted the word to 
be used to empower indigenous peoples, including granting them control over their lands. Unlike 
Bolivia, who took the actual word and made it a dominant factor in its state, Ecuador simply 
desired to leave the term vaguely defined, essentially ensuring that it would remain on the level 
of rhetoric without any significant substance (Becker, 2011, pp. 54). This ultimately affected the 
way that the indigenous movements were viewed during Correa’s administration, which lasted a 
decade. Legally, Ecuador is a plurinational state that recognizes indigenous peoples’ collective 
rights, languages and traditional forms of justice. The constitution celebrates the contributions of 
indigenous peoples and guarantees rights to self-determination, including to ancestral territories. 
Yet, they are still treated as second-class citizens whose concerns seem irrelevant in Ecuadorian 
politics. 
In Bolivia, their indigenous groups had to go through the same struggle. However, what 
makes Bolivia different is the nomination of their first indigenous president which has not 
happened in Ecuador. The debates in their constitution, as mentioned earlier, also dealt with the 
language that would be used and the definition for the term plurinational. This was also their 
general demand that they wanted viewed as a concept binding all other indigenous claims 
together. Comparable to Ecuador, Bolivia’s MAS party approached the proposal with 
ambivalence because they did not want to “antagonize the middle-class, which viewed the 
proposal with great reservation, or even hostility, because of the anxiety that the ‘plurinational 
state’ would lead to ethnic resentments and provoke division of the country” (Poweska, 2013, pp. 
260). While the indigenous were not able to win every proposal brought forth for the new 
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constitution, they did manage to change Bolivia’s name to the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
which increases their empowerment and their right to be perceived.  
The two Andean states are predominantly Spanish speaking, but with a major indigenous 
population in both countries, indigenous groups tried to propose the inclusion for one of their 
languages to be considered a main language. Ecuadorians’ struggle in the assembly was whether 
Kichwa and other indigenous languages would be granted official status. CONAIE argued that 
interculturality is a matter for every Ecuadorian and when a language is lost “a vision of the 
world disappears” (Becker, 2011, pp. 55). Alianza Pais, Correa’s party, voted against the 
proposal to grant the language official status. Correa’s belief was that, in much of the country, 
learning English was more important than learning Kichwa (Becker, 2011, pp. 56). Nevertheless, 
the proposal underwent review again after backlash from indigenous government officials. 
Article 2 of the constitution now states “Spanish is Ecuador’s official language; Spanish, Kichwa 
and Shuar are official languages for intercultural ties. The other ancestral languages are in 
official use by indigenous peoples in the areas where they live and in accordance with the terms 
set forth by law. The State shall respect and encourage their preservation and use” (Republica del 
Ecuador, 2008). While some considered it just as vague as the wording of plurinational in the 
constitution, it did mark progress in the way indigenous groups refused to back down on matters 
that are important to them. They used the same tenacity that brought them into the spotlight 
during the 1990s. Bolivia’s constitution also includes Spanish as the main language for the 
country. During their constitutional process, there were some groups, like those from Potosi, who 
proposed that “all the politicians and state administration should speak indigenous languages” 
(Poweska, 2013, pp. 197). Their main goal was for their range of indigenous languages to be 
included in the constitution and officially recognized on all administrative and institutional levels 
 
  Yepez 37 
of the Bolivian state. Their constitution had initially recognized 36 languages. According to 
Article 5 Section 1 of the Bolivian constitution:  
The official languages of the State are Spanish and all the languages 
of the rural native indigenous nations and peoples, which are Aymara, 
Araona, Baure, Bésiro, Canichana, Cavineño, Cayubaba, Chácobo, 
Chimán, Ese Ejja, Guaraní, Guarasu'we, Guarayu, Itonama, Leco, 
Machajuyai-kallawaya, Machineri, Maropa, Mojeñotrinitario, 
Mojeño-ignaciano, Moré, Mosetén, Movima, Pacawara, Puquina, 
Quechua, Sirionó, Tacana, Tapiete, Toromona, Uruchipaya, 
Weenhayek, Yaminawa, Yuki, Yuracaré and Zamuco (Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, 2009).  
The constitution does make it a point to enforce that Spanish must be used:  
The Pluri-National Government and the departmental governments 
must use at least two official languages. One of them must be 
Spanish, and the other shall be determined taking into account the use, 
convenience, circumstances, necessities and preferences of the 
population as a whole or of the territory in question. The other 
autonomous governments must use the languages characteristic of 
their territory, and one of them must be Spanish (Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, 2009). 
As of 2019, Bolivia had added three more indigenous languages to be included in the 
constitution, making the number of languages 39. For a country that was electing its first 
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indigenous president, it was important for the indigenous movements to be recognized and honor 
the culture Morales grew up in.  
Aside from issues of identification, one of the biggest issues affecting indigenous groups 
in both Ecuador and Bolivia are the violations of their respective governments regarding their 
land and human rights by investment projects that threaten their social and physical environment. 
For decades, indigenous groups have taken to the streets (or wherever they can be heard) to 
protest these violations of their rights.  
In Ecuador, the focus of recent protests has been the proposed development of the mining 
potential in the highlands. Ecuador, up to now, has not been a mining country, but it has come 
under increasing interest from international companies, especially from Canada and China, 
which are keen to take advantage of the strong demand for minerals and high global prices. 
According to Crabtree,  
[T]he development of mining has raised serious questions about rights 
to water and protection from environmental hazards, and threatens 
traditional ways of life. There have been several protest movements in 
recent years about who should control water distribution: the central 
government, local governments or local communities.  
(Crabtree, 2012).  
The government, despite its left-wing discourse and laws on prior consultation, has firmly 
defended its right to enter concession agreements with foreign mining companies. In 2008, 
Correa made changes to the constitution to further include participation of the indigenous; 
however, the constitution includes some ambiguities regarding natural resources. There has been 
“confirmation that nonrenewable resources belong to the state and that indigenous communities 
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have no special power over decision-making on their use” (De Shazo, 2009, p. 6). This violates 
both national and international law, in which governments are required to undergo a free, prior 
and informed consent process with communities before beginning any extraction projects near 
their territory to warn them of the negative repercussions and seek their consent.  
In Bolivia, President Evo Morales won the votes of the indigenous because of his 
indigenous background and the protections he promised them. Years into his presidency, he fell 
into the same cycle as Ecuador by joining forces with China to expand development. 
According to a report conducted by the International Federation of Human Rights, Bolivia 
imposed oil exploration projects such as the oil block “Nueva Esperanza” (New Hope), which 
overlaps with one of the three territories of the Tacana indigenous people. This territory is home 
to an indigenous people who live in voluntary isolation, the “Toromona.” Although the Tacana 
opposed the state exploration, in 2013 the Bolivian State won and reached an agreement with the 
oil companies BGP Bolivia, and the state company China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), in charge of exploration, to safeguard the territory and protect the Tacana and 
Toromona peoples. However, BGP ignored the agreements and caused environmental damage 
affecting the indigenous people’s livelihoods. (International Federation of Human Rights, 2018).  
Another incident occurred soon after the formation of the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 
2009. The Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) became the epicenter 
of a conflict over the construction of a road, initiated by Evo Morales’ administration, that would 
run through the park. Initially undertaken by the Brazilian company OAS, and funded by the 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the project was justified on the grounds that it would 
link the Departments of Beni and Cochabamba, and bring development to an isolated locality. 
However, indigenous peoples from the lowlands opposed this development proposal and, 
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together with their counterparts in the Andean region, organized a march that was violently 
dispersed by the Bolivian armed forces. 
Nevertheless, indigenous groups are fighting and making strides to oppose the corporate 
greed that the countries are participating in. In early April 2019, more than 200 Waorani people 
marched to the court in the Ecuadorian city of Puyo to begin their hearing against the Ecuadorian 
government. After long protesting oil extraction in its territory, the community sued three 
government bodies - the Ministry of Energy and Non-renewable Natural Resources, the 
Secretary of Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Environment - for violating their rights by 
conducting a faulty consultation process with the community and putting their territory up for an 
international oil auction. According to both national and international law, communities must be 
consulted before any extraction process is planned on or near their territory in what is called the 
free, prior and informed consultation process.  The Waorani community said the consultation 
process was only a series of presentations by the government about how oil money would benefit 
their community, but said nothing about the negative environmental effects of extraction 
projects. Because of the 2012 consultation process with the Waorani, and seven other indigenous 
nationalities, the Amazon rainforest was divided into 16 different oil blocks and put up for sale 
in an international oil auction. Last year, the government reduced the size of the oil auction to 
two blocks, removing block 22 that overlaps Waorani territory, but it quickly added that the 
region would not be exempt from future drilling plans. Lina Maria Espinosa is the community’s 
lawyer and has said that “the life of the Waorani is closely linked to its territory, and this 
territory is threatened by extractive activities, and the perspective of a Western world that 
ignores and denies interculturality and the relationship of these peoples with their 
territory,"(Brown, 2019). This has been a recurring issue throughout many indigenous territories 
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in developing countries because of outside countries coming in to build, or in Ecuador’s case, 
drill for oil. Oil has always been an important part of Ecuador's economy, contributing to much 
of its growth from 2006 to 2014, according to the World Bank. The socialist policies of former 
President Rafael Correa, and investments in education and social programs, funded largely from 
oil revenues, helped lower the poverty rate by 15 percent. But this economy has also angered 
indigenous communities in the Amazon rainforest, who have seen the oil industry cause 
contamination and community displacement. 
In the historic ruling, the judges highlighted several ways in which the consultation 
process was inadequate and violated the community's right to self-determination. According to 
the tribunal, during these consultation meetings: There was no real dialogue with communities, 
they were called without enough prior notice, there were not enough elders present, and there 
were no clear translations into the local Waorani language, among other problems. However, this 
is the second community to win a major lawsuit against the Ecuadorian government in recent 
years. Last year, the indigenous Kofan community in the northern Amazon sued the same three 
government bodies for allowing mining operations to continue near their territory, without 
undergoing a consultation process. Four judges ruled in the community's favor and 52 mining 
concessions were cancelled.  
These types of rulings can give indigenous communities aspirations that their hard work 
and rights should matter regardless of their economic, cultural or social standing. Governments 
try to take advantage of these situations and the lack of resources these communities may have, 
but with the help of organizations they can be properly represented.  
Currently, both Correa and Morales are out of office in their respective countries. While 
they tried to continue their presidencies, their citizens ultimately decided they were done with 
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their governing and it was time for change. President Correa finished his term in 2017 after 10 
tumultuous years. Their current president, Lenin Moreno, has implemented policy changes aimed 
at repairing damage suffered by democratic institutions during former President Rafael Correa’s 
decade in power. The changes have fostered a climate of open debate, but structural reforms are 
still needed. Albeit, President Moreno has been more active in allowing indigenous peoples to 
protest and voice their opinions for change, unlike Correa who had prohibited demonstrations as 
well as jailed the demonstrators. In 2019, Indigenous groups took to the streets to protest 
austerity measures imposed by Moreno that disproportionately affected them. This policy has 
benefited multinational corporations, the banks, and in general, powerful economic groups, at the 
expense of the middle and working classes, who are being pushed toward poverty and extreme 
poverty (Salgado, 2019). Moreno reached an agreement with indigenous groups to cancel the 
decision to eliminate fuel subsidies that sparked the protests, but the spirit of the movement also 
represents much more. Indigenous groups are taking back the political space that was taken away 
under Correa’s administration.  
Presently, Correa has been convicted on corruption charges and sentenced to eight years 
in prison. Correa was among 20 people, including his vice president, Jorge Glas, accused of 
accepting $8 million in bribes in exchange for public contracts from 2012 and 2016. The former 
president left Ecuador three years ago to Belguim, and his conviction, which he can appeal, 
leaves him subject to arrest if he returns (Leon Cabrera, 2019). The Court also banned him from 
participating in politics for the next 25 years. Correa denied the charges, describing them as a 
form of political persecution intended to prevent him and his allies from running in future 
national elections. Although he had vowed to retire from politics in 2017, he had shown interest 
in running for office in 2021 but if his conviction stands, that would be prevented.  It is not 
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uncommon in Latin American countries for former presidents to be convicted on charges of 
bribery. It has happened many times before, in many countries, and this is one aspect that Latin 
Americans wish would change and stop for the betterment of the country and the people in it.  
Bolivia’s former president Morales fled the country in November 2019, with just the 
clothes on his back and without a passport, to Mexico. He was accused of trying to steal an 
election, and the country’s military chief publicly suggested that he resign. Since then, Bolivia 
had been fiercely divided. His departure brought an abrupt end to one of the most historic 
presidencies. Several of his highest-ranking officials resigned along with him, including the three 
people after him in the line of presidential succession. The office was claimed by conservative 
Jeanine Añez, who is a former television presenter and had a brief position in the Bolivian 
Senate.  Within two days, Añez was endorsed by the military and proclaimed herself president, 
donning the sash of office as generals looked on approvingly. She alienated the indigenous 
population just as quickly, leading a group of followers to the Presidential Palace, where she 
raised an oversized Bible and declared that she was “returning the Bible to the palace” 
(Anderson, 2020), despite the constitution proclaiming Bolivia to be a secular nation. Añez then 
named an all-white cabinet, setting all the work accomplished by Morales and Bolivian 
indigenous groups many steps back. In addition, she signed a decree prohibiting “personality 
cults” in Bolivia’s institutions, and made it clear that she intended to purge Morales’s legacy and 
his presence from public life (Anderson, 2020). Most egregious in the aftermath of Morales’s 
ouster is the indiscriminate killing of approximately 30 peaceful protesters, many indigenous. 
The military opened fire after Añez issued a decree exempting the army and police from criminal 
responsibility for actions taken to restore order; after much internal outcry and international 
pressure, the decree has since been annulled (Hartmann, 2019). For many, Añez stokes fears of 
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colonialism and repressive dictatorships that silenced indigenous cultures. However, Añez 
believes that she is the liberator that Bolivia needs from Morales’s politics of class division. 
According to Añez: 
This was fourteen years of dictatorship, fourteen years of lies, 
fourteen years of oppression, from which we are trying to free 
Bolivians, to bring about a transition that can become a new starting 
point, a place where no one prohibits us from thinking differently. 
(Anderson, 2020).  
Previously, Bolivia’s presidents had been forbidden to serve consecutive terms, but a 
new provision allowed two in a row. In 2013, as Morales approached his two-term 
limit, he convinced the courts that his first term, which came before the constitution 
was amended, shouldn’t count toward his total; the following year, he won office 
again. In 2016, Morales tried yet another ploy - he held a referendum asking 
Bolivians to overrule the constitution and allow him a fourth term. Voters rejected 
his request, but the constitutional courts ruled that not allowing Morales to run would 
violate his human rights (Anderson, 2020). His opposition held protests, however, he 
still held widespread support among indigenous and poor citizens. On election night, 
he was leading in votes but needed just ten more votes to avoid a second round of 
voting. He called a halt on the election and 24 hours after it resumed, he had 
coincidentally reached the margin of votes needed. There was outcry of fraud, and 
after an investigation from the Organization of American States (OAS), he knew it 
was time to resign.  
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Currently, Morales has moved to Argentina and continues to support 
candidates running for elections in May. Similar to Ecuador, there have been at least 
a hundred and sixty people, including senior officials from Morales’s party, that have 
been prosecuted or detained, on accusations that range from corruption and terrorism 
to “making illegal appointments” (Anderson, 2020). Until elections are over, the 
indigenous people are in the hands of interim president Añez. They must fight and 
sustain that determination to keep their plurinationality for years to come.  
 Indigenous people have seen struggle and have fought through these adversities in both 
Bolivia and Ecuador. Their oppression and marginalization continues, but with each protest and 
demonstration they get closer to their goal and the bright future they see for themselves. 
Recognition seems like the easiest task a state can offer, however after years of colonization and 
colonial mentalities, it is hard to leave those ideals behind. Ultimately, with the help of human 
rights and indigenous groups, the original people of Ecuador and Bolivia can continue to practice 
their culture, language, beliefs, education and medicine without the fear of being persecuted or 
misrepresented with each passing presidential administration.   
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CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion 
As illustrated above, the indigenous people of Bolivia and Ecuador have extremely 
different political statuses; however, they all face the same key impediments to having adequate 
political representation and access. These obstacles are either developmental or cultural. 
Developmentally, the indigenous people lack physical infrastructure, adequate healthcare, and 
access to education. Because the majority of indigenous people live in rural and geographically 
hard-to-reach areas, there needs to be a way by which information can reach the indigenous 
communities; this deficiency is illustrated by the lack of knowledge regarding the Law of 
Popular Participation in Bolivia. If the indigenous are not in good health and are illiterate, 
becoming politically involved becomes nearly impossible. The fact that “indigenous” has 
become synonymous with “impoverished” and “poor” ultimately demonstrates the 
developmental obstacles that have impeded their political participation. Culturally, the 
hegemonic discrimination faced by the indigenous people even by federal institutions has proven 
to be extremely problematic. The highly complex nature of this issue suggests it will not be 
solved soon unless drastic economic and cultural changes are made. It is only with perseverance 
and dedication on the part of the indigenous, with support from the international community, that 
human rights may finally be realized for this vulnerable population. The key to actualizing 
human rights for indigenous peoples lies in their legitimate and successful political participation.  
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